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Privatizatjon, Information and Incentives
ABSTRACT
Inthispaper,the choice between public and privateprovision ofgoodsand servicesis
considered.In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and
thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference
between the two modes concerns the transactions costs faced by the government when
attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less
costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention
under public ownership can have its advantages; but the tact that a promise not to intervene is
more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects, The
Fundamental Privatization Theorem (analogous to The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics)ispresented, providing conditions under which government production cannot
improveuponprivateproduction.Therestrictivenessof theseconditions is evaluated.
David E.N. Sappingtori Joseph E. Stiglitz Bell Communications Research Princeton University Morristown, NJ 07960 Princeton, NJ 08544INTRODUCTION.
The issueof whichgoods and services should be produced publicly and which ones are better
produced privately has long been a central concern of economists. The recent trend toward
privatization" reflects a judgment that previous 'assignments were incorrect —thatsome
activities within the public sector might be carried out better within the private sector. In this
paper, we provide a conceptual framework within which several of the central issues can be
addressed. Our particular concern is with the roles played by incentives and imperfect
information in the privatization decision.
Although the labels 'public" and private" may elicit images of very distinct modes of
operation, many similarities exist between the everyday operations of public and private
enterprise in practice. Both modes involve substantial delegation of responsibility. Neither
Con ;ressmen nor minority shareholders directly control the daily activities of an enterprise that
is, in principle, under their control. Instead, oversight of the arm's operation is delegated to a
commission or board of directors. A chief executive officer or president is also endowed with
considerable discretion to influence the firm's operations. There generally follow many additional
layers of authority under both forms of ownership. The hierarchy of authority terminates in
both cases with managers who use their precise knowledge of local conditions to make daily
decisions that directly affect the firm's performance. Thus, if one examines their everyday
functioning, public enterprises and privately owned firms appear quite similar in many respects.
The important difference between public and private ownership, in our view, involves the
residual rights of intervention. Under public enterprise, the government retains some authority
to intervene directly in the delegated production arrangements and implement major policy
changes when it is deemed necessary to do so. Under private ownership, special rights of
intervention are afforded creditors (in the event of bankruptcy) and major financial interests
(who can gather the resources necessry to finance a takeover of the private arm); but the-.4-
government'sright to intervene is more limited than under public ownership.'
Even in this dimension, however, the distinction between public and private ownership is not
entirely clear cut. For example, under conditions of national emergency (such as war), the
government has intervened in the operations of private arms, diverting their resources to better
serve the 'social interest". Furthermore, banks and other creditors often put pressure on
government-owned firms in times of financial crisis. In addition, the government has been known
to intervene in order to rescue private firms from bankruptcy.
What seems important to focus on, therefore, are the transactions costs associated with
intervention. Direct government intervention into delegated production arrangements generally
involves smaller costs under public provision than under private provision. As we argue below,
such ease of intervention can constitute both a potential benefit and a potential cost of public
provision; these benefits and costs must be carefully weighed against any other inherent
advantages and disadvantages of public enterprise.
In fact, mote than just the 'rights of intervention' are at issue. Also at issue are: (1) the
incentives to intervene and not to intervene, and (2) the limitations on abilities to commit to
intervene or not to intervene. Cboosing a mode of organization can be thought of as affecting the
costs and benefits of intervention, and thus as altering incentives to intervene, substituting in
part for commitment abilities.
In the next section, we present a basic theorem concerning privatization. The theorem
provides condition, under whichallof the government's objectives can be attained by an
appropriately designed auction Qf the rights to produce a given product or service. The theorem
plays a role in the privatization issue much like the role played by the Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics more generally: it says that when certain conditions are satisfied, government
involvement cannot improve upon the performance of the private market. An examination of theconditions of the theoremprovides a checklist of"privatiiatioafailures'(analogous to 'market
failurei'), i.e., reasonswhyprivatizationmay not achieve the most desired outcome.
Unfortunately, determining whether government production would remedy these failures is a
more difficult matter. To answer that question, a theory of government behavior is needed.
While we do not present such a theory, our general approach does offer some insight into the
kinds of situations where government production ismostlikely to alleviate the problems
associated with private production.
Though we focus in the next section on the choice between public and private enterprise, we
point out in the foLlowing section that, in practice, the relevant choice of organizational mode is
not always the "either/or choice of public versus private provision. Institutional arrangements
like regulation occupy intermediate positions in the continuum of ownership possibilities. Such
institutions incorporate many of the desirabLe (and undesirable) features of both public and
private enterprise.
THE SCOPE FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTION.
It is well known that tot private goods (i.e., goods whose consumption by one individual
precludes their consumption by another), private production can attain a Pareto efficient
allocation of resources, provided certain conditions are satisfied. (These conditions are specified
in the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics and pertain to the production technology
and to the dispersion of information in the economy.) If the distribution of income that results is
not the desired distribution, then only limited government intervention —inthe form of lump-
sum redistributions —iscalled for. Government intervention is required, ior instance, if there
are externalities, natural monopolies', or public goods. In the case of public goods (where
consumption of the good by one person does not preclude consumption by others), the
government must determine the amount of the good to be purchased if there is to be a Pareto--4-
efficientlevel of consumption. Though there is agreement that some intervention is necessary in
eachof these cases,there is not agreement on the formthatthe intervention should take. In the
present discussion, we focus on one aspect of that decision —private versus publicproduction.
Thegovernment's objective in choosing among alternative form! of production are threefold.
(1) Economic Efficiency: The government wishes to ensure that those who have a comparative
advantage in production undertake it, and that the appropriate techniques of production and
levelsof effort are suppLied. (2) Equity:The government desires to fulfill certain distributional
objectives. (3) Rent Extraction: The government hopes toextract as much rent(i.e., profits)
from producersaspossible. (Note that concern over rent extraction can be viewed as a special
case of the government's concern with rent distribution. Here, the distribution is between
'consumers" and "firms".)
Our central theorem (which is an application of results in the "principal -agent"literature)3
provides conditions under which all of these objectives can be attained "perfectly' through an
auction system whereby potential producers bid for the right to provide the good. This result
requires two or more risk neutral firms (agents) who have symmetric beliefs about the least cost
production technology. Actual costs ue only learned by the chosen producer just prior to
production. (For simplicity, assume the product is produced with increasing returns to scale, so
industry costs are minimized with a single producer.) The government (principal) has a certain
valuation, v, of the level of output, Q,ofthe product or service in question. This valuation is
given by v =V(Q).Note that any distributional objectives can be reflected in V(.) by explicitly
including in the government's valuation function the levels of consumption of different groups
within the population. These elements characterise what we will call 'the ideal setting'.
The following simple procedure ensures that the government attains all of its objectives in the
idea! setting: The government auctions off the right to receive payment for production, P(.),0
accordingto its valuation of output, i.e., P(Q)= V(Q).in other words, the production decision
is delegated entirely to the producer, and the producer is paid for his output an amount exactly
equal to the value of that output to the government. The result of implementing a compensation
scheme of this form isthatthe firm submitting the highest bid (and therefore chosen to be the
producer) will subsequently select the production level most desired by the government,
conditional on the realization of actual production costs. And with the risk neutral firms initially
sharing symmetric beliefs about costs, the bidding procedure will guarantee that no rents accrue
to the producer. Thus, the government can ensure the ideal outcome via delegation of
production, even though it has no knowledge of the production technology.4 We refer to this
result —thatwith the appropriately designed auction, public production cannot improve upon
private production —asthe Fundamental Privatization Theorem. As noted above, we refer to
the conditions under which the Theorem holds as the 'ideal setting.
As simple and attractive as the auction procedure sounds, one might question the widespread
concern over whether and how to delegate (privatize) provision of various government services.
But we know of no major instance in which the procedure has been implemented. The reason
may be that the ideal setting incorporates a number of features that do not necessarily
characterize the settings germane to privatization discussions.
There are three main reasons why the ideal outcome described above will not generally be
attainable in practice. First, there will often be difficulties in extracting rents from the chosen
producer. Second, contracting costs and institutional restrictions on feasible contracts limit the
government's flexibility in contract design. Third, problems with contract implementation are
likelytoarise. To illustrate these three broad categories of concern, we re-examine the ideal
setting in some detail, pointing out the critical and often unrealistic features it incorporates.-6-
Imperfect Rent Acquisition.
Even ifthe governmentcan select theproducer with the lowest expected costs and induce the
producerto operate at minimum realized cost, in practice the producer will often earn rents.
Such rents generally arise when the potential producers are averse to risk, when competition for
the tight to produce is limited, and when the government has pertinent information not shared
by potential producers. We examine these three issues in turn.
Risk Aversion. A critical feature of the ideal setting is that potential producers not be
averse to risk. The assumption ensures that the government need Rot pay any risk premia to the
firms, even though their knowledge of the production technology may be quite limited and,
consequently, their final compensation quite uncertain.
When potential producers have better information about the technology of production and
are mote averse to risk than the government, an important tradeoff is introduced. Delegation of
production is advantageous because production decisions are placed in the hands of individuals
who an better informed (and thus better able to carry out production). On the other hand, risk
premia must be paid to compensate producers for the risk they bear. To the extent that the
government absorbs risk for private producers, more rents can be captured for the government.
However, risk absorption by the government reduces the incentives for efficient performance by
producers. And to the extent that the government forces private producers to absorb the risk,
production may be undertaken not by the producer with the least expected costs, but by the
producer with the least aversion to risk. (Of course, the costs of risk absorption are no less real
than other costs.) Also note that •'the government" is more tolerant of risk than private
producers, government production may be desirable: the extra rents that must be paid to the
private sector when production takes place there may outweigh "the government's' cost
disadvantage.—7-
Considerationsof risk areclearlyimportantin determining the choice of publicversusprivate
provision and in designing the auction in the event of privatization. (For example, costsharing
provisions of defense contracts reduce the compensation that the government must pay for risk
absorption; but they also have well-documented efficiency costs. Furthermore, one of the
arguments for royalty versus bonus bidding for oil and gas leases is that under royalty bidding,
wherein a unit royalty fee is placed on extracted hydrocarbons, private firms absorb less risk.)
But characterizing the extent and concentration of risk in the two settings is not straightforward.
Under public provision, much risk is ultimately borne by the 'owners' of the enterprise.
Because the owners here are the entire populous, risk is widely diffused. Under private provision,
the stock market mayserveto diffuse much of the risk inherent in the operation. To the extent
that it does, it is not apparent that the relative degrees of risk aversion for the principal and
agent should be systematically higher under public or private enterprise. What is apparent,
however, i that if risk is widely diffused, strong incentives for diligent performance will be
lacking under bothmodesof operation. (What is particularly relevant for organizational
performance is whether decision-makers bear the full brunt of the consequences of their decisions.
To the extent that they do, they are likely to act in risk averse ways; to the extent that they
don't, incentives will be blunted.)
The absence of good risk markets offers one example where "market failures" impinge on the
privatization decision. Another example occurs when the interest rate faced by a private
producer exceeds that fated by the government. This market imperfection, like the absence of
risk markets, can be explained in terms of imperfect information and transactions costs. The
possibility of defauJt by private producers raises their costs of capital; and a real difference exists
in the "costs of finance" under public and private ownership because default risks are borne
differently. The deviation between public and private rates of interest in the case of oil leases is- B-
sufficiently important that thegovernment obtains onlyasmall fraction of the total socialrents
under bonus bidding. Similar considerationswould arguethatthe governmentshouldown,
rather than lease,its buildings (unless strong countervailing managerial advantages to private
ownership can be established). In effect, in each of these instances the government is borrowing
indirectlyfrom the private sector,but paying far higher rates than it does on Treasury bills.
Limited Competition. Another reason why rents may accrue to the selectedproducer is
the absence of sufficient competition at the bidding stage. In the ideal setting, a number of
potential producers are symmetrically informed about potential production costs. When there
are very few competitors, each with a different assessment of likely costs, then the winning bidder
will generally receive rents. And to limit these rents, it is usually optimal to induce inefficient
production cx post, even if bidders are risk neutral. Intuitively, the distortions arise because they
render the 'object" being auctioned more similar to the various bidders, thereby fostering more
competitive bidding. Defense and oil again provide salient examples. In both cases, competition
is generally limited. (In recent auctions for oil and gas tracts, the average number of bidders for
each tract has been less than two.) Some have argued for royalty bidding in preference to bonus
bidding, even though the royalties may distort the pattern of hydrocarbon extraction. The
argument is that the gain in government revenues from bidding that result under royalty bidding
more than offsets the losses in efficiency that may arise in the form of too little extraction.5
A related "distortion' is that it will be optimal for the government to undertake productioci
in some instances where its expected costs exceed those of the most efficient producer. The
threat of losing the right to produce altogether induces potential producers to bid for that right
more aggressively.'
In some cases, oily one firm with the technological capability is available to carry out
production. This i. particularly likely to be the case when the technology is new and experience-9-
in the marketplace is a critical element in keeping production costs low. Hence, if one firm has
been the sole producer for a period of time, that firm may well have a significant advantage over
other potential producers. When there is effectively only one serious bidder, the firm can extract
rents from the government. And with only a single firm producing a unique product, there are
no natural benchmarks against which performance can be compared. Thus, with no Cr ante or cx
post competition, the problems of control and rent extraction become very difficult ones. But
note that under these circumstances government production faces a similar problem: in cases
that lack a natural comparison of efficiency, it will be difficult to ascertain whether government
production is efficient. Precisely these kinds of circumstances provide government bureaucrats
with the opportunity to increase the size of their organization. (See William Niskanen,
Bureaucrats and Politicians', Journal of Law and Economics, 18(1975): 617-643.)
Of course, the number of potential and actual producers in an industry need not be exogenous
parameters from the government's point of view. By intentionally subcontracting production to
more than one existing firm, the government can ensure competition in present production and in
future related production. Furthermore, the government can actually create its own firms or
subsidize the formation of new firms. In these ways, the government can influence directly the
extent of competition in relevant markets, but obviously at a cost.
Informed Principal. Another special feature of the ideal setting concerns the distribution
of information between the government (or, more generally, the "principal') and potential
producers (or "agents'). In the ideal setting, the agents have better information than the
principal. When the principal's information (about, say, the inherent difficulties of the
productive task in qution) is better than that of potential producers, however, the nature of the
incentive scheme designed by the principal may signal some of his private knowledge. To conceal
this information (rather than reveal, for example, that the task is really quite difficult and likely- 10-
torequire large investments of effort and capital to be completed successfully), the principal may
deviate from the simple scheme described above. Such a deviation may result in a different mode
of production or a different distribution of rents.
Oil lease sales again provide an example. The government calculates the value of a lease on
the basis of the information it has. It then leases the tract only if the bid is sufficiently high
relative to this estimate. Note that if the private sector believed the government to be well
informedandabkto set a minimum bidin theauction equalto theexpected value of the oil,
thenbidderswouldbelieve thatthey can onlywin the auction itthey bid too much.Hence,they
willnot bid at all. More generally,the fact that the government has some superior information
can haveadverse (though perhapsnotquite soextreme)effectson biddingbehavior.
Ingeneral, whenever the principal's superior knowledge is difficult to convey by means other
than direct •mteraction with the producer during the production process, the chosen mode of
organization may be the one that best facilitates such ongoing communication. Whether there
are important instances where this concern enters the decision about whether to 'privatize
production remains to be established.
Contracting CostsandLimitation..
We now examine how institutional restrictions on contracts and costs of writing contracts can
complicate the ideal setting. The institutional restrictions include limits on the liability of
producers and limited commitment on the part of the government. Contracting costs arise, in
part, from the difficulty in anticipating all possible contingencies.
Limits ofLiabilitg.In the ideal setting, the producer may conceivably make large losses.
The only requirement imposed is that producers expecttobreak even when they submit their
bids. With imperfect information about costs, cxantecost estimates may be more optimistic- II.-
thanactual cost realizations. Under such realizations, the producer will prefer, cx post, that he
had never entered into any agreement with the government. And if there are bounds on the
looses a contractor can be forced to bear (due, say, to bankruptcy laws, political considerations,
etc.), the contractor may renege on the contract rather than provide the promised services. In
such circumstances, the ideal outcome for the government is no longer ensured.
Consider the implications of liability restrictions for the provision of national security. The
social losses that might arise from failure to provide adequate defense could be astronomical --
farin excess of any 'bond" that a private producer could conceivably post to ensure performance.
Thus, with feasible penalties for failure that are dwarfed by the social losses that would result
from failure, private producers cannot be induced through monetary means to invest the
appropriate level of effort to prevent failure.
This does not imply, however, that public provision is necessarily the superior mode of
operation. The penalties that can be imposed on public officials when a failure (or, more
generally, a deterioration of service) occurs are not unbounded. And even under public
ownership, many facets of production are commonly subcontracted to private firms. Thus, the
debilitating effects of limited liability restrictions on performance incentives arise under both
public and private provision of services.
Lack of Commitment. One interpretation of liability limitations is that the producer is
unabletocommit himself to carry out the terms of a contract to which he has initially agreed.
Commitment abilities on the part of the government are also essential for the delegation scheme
described above to befeasible.
Toachieve its most preferred outcome through the auction proceduredescribedabove, the
government must be able tocredibly commititself to compensate the producer as promised. In- 12-
particular,the government must be able to convince potential producers that no renegotiation of
the contract will be carried out once a producer is selected, and that payments made to the
producer (P(Q)) will equal the value of the output to the government (V(Q)). Thus even though
the producer may end up with extremely large profits, the government must be able to credibly
promise not to tax away these gains; similarly, the government cannot subsidize losses cx post
that were agreed to be a possibility cx ante.Absentsuch commitment, the producer knows that,
in fact, V(Q) is not the relevant compensation schedule; consequently, the government's most
preferred outcome is not assured.
The government's commitment abilities may well vary according to the chosen mode of
organization. Private ownership generally puts some distance between the government and the
producer, thereby making more credible a promise not to use public funds to subsidize losses
incurred by the producer. Of course, there are instances where public funds have been put at risk
to rescue private firms from bankruptcy. The Chrysler Corporation "bail-out' program is one
example in recent U.S. history. Nevertheless, the transactions costs (which included public
hearings, careful legal scrutiny, etc.) of such intervention were substantial. Promises not to
subsidize the losses of public enterprises are generally more difficult to keep. The French
experience with the supersonic transport airplane is but one example to this effect. Using the
terminology employed in the introduction, the issue here concerns the transactions costs of
intervention. Public ownership tends to reduce the costs of government intervention, and thus
makes such intervention more likely, ceteris paribvzs.
Contracting Costs. To this point, we have assumed that it is costless to write down all
possible contingencies and agree on payment and performance for all such events. In fact,
contracts may be very costly to negotiate, and many contingencies are virtually impossible to
foresee. This applies particularly when the production technology is very complex and subject to- 13-
frequent change, as in the defense sector for example.Recognizingthis fact introduces the
possibility that complete decentralization may not be so desirable; instead, continual
communication and renegotiation between "principal' and "agent" may be mutually desirable in
order to deal with unforeseen contingencies.7
The nature of the cx post interaction is, again, affected by a whole set of production decisions.
Ifthe government choosesa single supplier, theninformationalasymmetries will be created
betweenthat supplier and other potential suppliers. In the presence of perfect capital markets
andwithriskneutrality, the expectedvalue of these additionalrentsfrom cxpostrenegotiation
will bereflected in initial bids. But even under theseextreme assumptions, economicefficiency
may not beassured:the firm bidding the most may not be the least cost producer, but the ftrm
with the greatest cxpost bargainingability; and the cx postbargainsthemselves may not be
efficient.5
Once the possibility ofcontinued interactionis introduced, the issue of which mode of
organization bestFacilitatesthis interaction in aconstructivemannerarises.Acriticalquestion
concernswhich parties are optimallyincludedin the ongoinginteraction.In particular, should
Congress have oversight responsibilities, or should theybeleft to the Judiciary? And should the
publichaveanydirect sayin matters? Permitting the public somecontinuingdirect influenceon
theproducer's activitiesmayhave the effectof undermining anyauthority or commitment
powersof the Congress.Asnotedabove, limiting itscommitmentpowerscan reduce the ability
ofCongresstoeffect the public's most desired outcome. Thus, this effect must be weighed
againstthebeneficial role that direct accessby thepubLic can play in monitoring the activities of
bothCongressand producers.
UnknownBenefits. A relatedobservation isthat it is not a trivialexercisefor the
principal(government)tospecify completelyits preferences.Inotherwords, thebenefit function- 14 -
V(Q)may not even be known to the principal. This could occur because V(Q) may be an
aggregation of the preferences of many 'principals that is difficult to specify and communicate
through the political 5y5• Another reason why V(Q) may not be known could simply be that
the commodity in question is a new one whose attributes change rapidly with developing
technology. For whatever reason, if the benefit function V(Q) is not perfectly known, then the
simple acid complete decentralization effected in the ideal setting will not be feasible, and efficient
production cannot be guaranteed by the procedure.
In many cases, the government may delegate to the private producer the right to determine
the payoff function, P(Q), within a certain domain. That is, the firm is afforded limited freedom
in setting a pricing structure. Although the private firms may indeed be better informed about
consumers' demand functions, awarding them pricing freedom introduces a potential source of
inefficiency: the winning bidder may not be the most efficient producer, but the firm that knows
best how to price discriminate. Thus, only in certain limiting cases will the payoff function
facing the firm correspond to the one the government would have implemented if it shared the
firm's private information.
The cause of the government's limited knowledge of V(Q) will influence the correct policy
prescription. To illustrate, suppose members of the public know their individual preferences, but
Congress does not. In this case, good reasons exist to facilitate direct interaction between
producers and the public, limiting the role of Congress. Hence, it may well be left to private
enterprise to discern and satisfy the desires of the public. This is particularly likely to be true
when competition among producers is feasible and the commodity in question is "common" --and
therefore readily understood and evaluated by consumers. In this case, careful supervision of
producers by the government to protect consumers is not necessary. When consumers can
monitor the performance of producers easily and have alternative sources to turntoif they are- 15 -
notsatisfied with a particular supplier (i.e., if sufficient cx postcompetitionexists), consumers
canreadily discipline a producer themselves toensure that the commodities that maximize their
benefitfunctionareproduced; they need not relyon thegovernment to do so.
Of course, the privatization debate focuses on industries where scale economies are such that
few producers exist or thecommodity inquestion is a public good.Inthe caseof publicgoods, a
free-rider problem arisesinmonitoringperformance(because no one individual hassufficient
incentive to monitor,eventhough the total social benefits frommonitoringoutweigh the
associated costs). With scale economies, there is an information problem due to the absence of
alternative suppliers.As a result consumers have difficulty judging and evaluating
performance. Thus,monitoringby consumers with the implicit threat of switchingsuppliers
should not be expected to work well in these settings.
If the limited knowledge of the government's benefit functionV(Q)arises because consumers
do not know their own preferences, then it may be important for the government to monitor
directly the performance of producers, ensuring that they act in the interests of consumers.
Consequently, optimal design of a governing structure may entail relatively small transactions
costs of government interventioninto theactivitiesofsubcontractors. Toillustrate,consider the
caseof education. Exactly what constitutes "education is not readily specified, measured,or
contracted for. Furthermore, individuals often are not certain exactly how they value education;
and what constitutes an adequate education is subject to continual change. For all these reasons,
facilitating ongoing government supervision via the public provision of education may be
desirable.
Problems In Implementing Contract..
Wenowconsider the complications that arise in implementing contracts. Four issues are- 16 -
addressed here: problems in measuring performance, limits on the ability to capitalize the
enterprise, problems with multiple products, and the difficulties introduced by complicated
hierarchies of control.
ImperfectMeasurement. Inthe ideal setting, the "output" of the producer can be observed
perfectly and costlessly by all parties. In practice, performance has many components, and some
are difficult to measure accurately. For example, all aspects of the quality of a service are hard
to quantify, particularly when the same product may be valued and perceived differently by
different consumers.
When the performance of producers cannot be readily monitored, a serious control problem
may arise under both public and private provision. Which mode is best suited to deal with the
problem is an important question for future research. We note only that the remarks made
above about the consequences of imperfect knowledge of the benefit function V(Q) apply here.
CapitalizationConsiderations. Inthe ideal setting, no separation existed between the
ownership and the management of the productive enterprise. Furthermore, the owner/manager
of the firm was able to buy and sell assets. Profits, therefore, were readily consumed by
transferring net cash flows from the enterprise to the owner/manager. This feature of the
incentive scheme allowed the preferences of the relevant parties to be perfectly aligned, and
motivational issues were readily resolved. In practice, such capitalisation is not possible;
managers of both publicly and privately owned firms cannot be rewarded according to the
increment in (the present discounted value of the) profits that their activities generate. Knowing
this, managers will take their rents in other forms. In public enterprise, rents are often awarded
in the form of political patronage. In both public and private enterprise, executives receive
compensation in the form of job-related perquisites. While such forms of compensation may help- 17 —
tomotivate executives and managers, obvious inefficiencie, arise. For example, when
compensation is not perfectly correlated with profits, executives will be slow to reinvest any
excess revenues with the intent of generating future profit. Instead, the firm will be bled via
rent extraction in the aforementioned forms; hence the need for ongoing supervision of activities.
Thus, once thereisdelegation of responsibility and an effective separation of ownership and
management, there is dissolution of performance incentives under both public and private
ownership. Whether the problem is more severe under one mode of organization or the other
remains an open question. The answer depends, in part, on how well performance can be
monitored, how effective is competition, etc. in the two modes.
Aggregationof Products. Inthe ideal setting, a single unidimensional product was
produced by a single firm. In effect, the decisions concerning the provision of this product were
isolated from all others. In practice, the delegation decision is not so simple.
When there are multiple products whose provision must be secured, global knowledge of the
least costly means of producing every conceivable output vector must be known to at least two
risk neutral contractors in order to ensure the achievement or the government's most preferred
outcome. Such knowledge is unlikely in practice. And absent such global knowledge, the
government will be forced to delineate boundaries between productive activities despite being
poorly informed about the best way to do so. Asaresult, inefficiencies will generally arise.
(Indeed, the only way to avoid these problems is for the government to engage in bidding over
the entire economy.)
To illustrate the problem, suppose the government wishes to procure two distinct and fairly
complex products. The government is aware that the products are quite intricate, but it is not
fully aware of the production compleinentarities between them. (Concerns of this sort seem- 18 -
particularly relevant in the telecommunications industry.)To ensure efficient procurement, the
government establishes twocommissions,one to oversee both the acquisition anddistributionof
eachproduct.Evenif, as in the ideal setting,eachcommission secures the maximum possible
surplusforconsumers withinitsassigned sector, it is not certain that aggregate surplus will be
maximized. Both design and production complementarities will generally be overlooked by the
identified procedure; yet the procedure is not an unreasonable one in light of the government's
limited knowledge of global production technologies.'0
A related problem involves joint products. It may not be possible to produce one product
(e.g., military equipment) without simultaneously producing another (e.g., knowledge of
conftdential military information). Thus, to control the distribution of one product
(information), it may be necessary to compromise on the mode of producing the other product
(equipment).
HierarchicalControl /MultiplePrincipals.In the ideal setting, the preferences of the
principal,'the government',will essentially dictate social welfare.The single princial aLso
managesdirectlythe procurement ofthecommodity inquestion.Inpractice,hierarchicalcontrol
poses a muchmore difficultproblem. The difficulty stems from at least three sources.First,
thereare many principals whose preferencesmaynot coincide. Second, controloverdelegated
production arrangements,designof compensation schedules, andother suchmatters are all
delegatedtoa party(e.g., Congress) that may be partially motivated by selfinterest. In other
words, the 'principal' of the ideal settingisreally an "agent' of a group of principals;this
udelegated principal's" valuation of ultimate performance may reflect his own preferences as well
as (or instead of) those of the principals he is supposed to serve. Third, control authority is
generallydelegated tomore than one party. And with multiple delegated principals, each having
different mandates and eachhaving controlover different policy instruments, the outcome will- 19 -
generallynot be Pareto-efficient.t1
With multiple principals, the obvious problem of aggregation exists. Unless the principals
have identical preferences, it will be a difficult task simply to aggregate preferences into a
consistent social welfare function like V(Q). More commonly, each principal has control over a
particular part of the payoff function. Thus, if there are several commodities, the principal
might set P(Q1) as the payoff function for the ith commodity. The total payoff function is then
the sum of these individual payoff functions, and may have little resemblance to any consistent
social welfare function V(Q). Furthermore, even if this function could be constructed and
conveyed to the delegated principal, there is no guarantee that this individual would act selflessly
to maximize the function. When the actions of the delegated principal are not readily monitored,
and when the private interests of the delegated principal do not coincide with the social interest
(so that difficulties in controlling both the delegated principal and the producer arise), perfect
internalization of the social preferences will not be achieved.12
When we putnameson the relevant actors, an additional related complication becomes
apparent. Along with whatever other powers that the public (i.e., the principals) delegates to
Congress (the delegated principal), Congress always has the nearly unLimited power to tax the
public. And Congress cannot credibly commit itseLf not to exercise this power. Consequently,
the public may wish to put restrictions on the subcontracting arrangements that Congress can
fashion. For example, salary limits and restrictions on profits to subcontractors may be imposed,
as might restrictions on the types of projects that can be undertaken.
Obviously, such restrictions can have deleterious effects on incentives and hence on
performance. Whether the social losses from such effects outweigh the potential gains of
restricting delegated production arrangements seems likely to depend on the nature of the task in
question. If the task is fairly routine and well understood, and if the variance in performance is-20-
smallgiven adequateeffortby the producer,restrictionson compensation willgenerallynot
compromiseperformance seriously. (Thetask of garbagecollection comesto mind in this
regard.) However,fortasks that are inherentlymorecomplex and that require creative and
diligent effortbyexperts toenhancethe probability of'success' of a risky venture (such as
researchand development), the undesirable effectsof restrictions on compensationtocontractors
may be quitepronounced.When prospective personal gains areslight,the most qualified
contractors may not be attracted. And those contractors that are attracted may have little
incentive toput forth effort if rewards are not commensurate with performance.
MIXEDMODES OF ORGANIZATION.
The preceding discussion focused on thedichotomy 0fpublic versus private provision of
services. In fact,thechoice need not be an "either/or' choice. Some components of a service can
be provided publicly and others privately. And therearemethods of control such as regulation
that are intermediate between public and private ownership in termsofthe associated
transactions costs of government intervention. In this section, we comment very briefly on the
nature and role of these mixed modes of operation.
To begin, we note that the production process has many stages. Raw materials must be
acquired, intermediate products manufactured, and the final product delivered to consumers. In
practice, all of these activities need not be carried out by the government, even under 'public
enterprise'. To illustrate, consider the provision 0f national security. Although the final product
is delivered to consumers by the government, many inputs (e.g., weapons and equipment) are
secured from private producers. Thus, the distinction between public and private provision ot a
service is not entirely clear-cut. The relevant distinction may be where private enterprise ends
and public control begins in the sequence of productive activities that comprise a service.- 21-
Furthermore,even when the provisionof a commodity is carried out entirely in the private
sector, government influence is seldom altogether absent. For instance, legislation affecting the
content and distribution of products is commonplace. In addition, members of the legislative
and executive branches of government have been known to jawbone' private industry in an
attempt to influence its behavior.
The distinction between public and private provision become, even more hazy when one
recognizes that some modes of organization incorporate features of both public and private
provision. One such mode is regulation. Firms that operate in regulated industries (such as
utilities) are generally privately owned. Yet regulators, who are agents of the government,
closely scrutinize their activities, and control the return on their investments.
In a sense, the auctions that we analyzed in the previous section can be thought of as auctions
to become a regulated firm, where the payoffs to the arm are delineated by a predetermined
valuation function. Yet important differences exist between the typical regulated industry and
the ideal setting described above. (a) In many cases, there is no auction for the right to provide a
particular service (e.g., cable television). (b) The regulator seldom compensates the firm
according to the social valuation, V(Q), of its activities. Rather, restrictions are imposed on
pricing functions, on allowed rates of return, and on admissible costs. (c) While in our model
there is a once and for all determination of both the franchisee and the compensation function
(V(Q) can be interpreted as a dated vector of outputs), in regulated industries the terms of the
relationship are reviewed and changed periodically.
Still, a rationale for regulation can be surmised from the considerations outlined above.
Competition is often absent or limited in regulated industries due to economies of scale in
production. Thus, one role of the regulator is to provide ongoing monitoring of the firms
performance. Regulated firms are also generally characterized by complicated production- 22-
technologies,so that the capabilities of a producer and the risks inherent in production are
difficult to discern. A second role of the regulator, therefore, involves gathering information that
can inform policy decisions and limit the rents of the firm. In doing so, the regulator (if properly
motivated) develops the expertise necessary to direct activities in the best interests of his
constituents. With less complicated technologies, the need for such an expert would be less
pronounced. The key point here is that regulation lowers the transactions costs of intervention
by a particuLar government agent (i.e., the informed regulator) relativetounregulatedprivate
ownership.
One aspect of the complex production technology in regulated industries is the specialized
assets employed in production. Because these assets have limited alternative use, they are prone
to expropriation once installed. Consequently, to attract the assets initially, the government
must be able to credibly commit itself not to unfairly exploit the owners of these assets once the
assets are in place. The institution of regulation may help to provide such commitment ability.
The requirement that regulated firms be awarded a 'fair rate of return' on invested capital does,
at a minimum, raise the transactions costs of expropriating the firm and its shareholders.
However, the matter is not entirely cle& cut. It is not impossible for the assets of a regulated
firm to be expropriated. The very fact that regulators are endowed with the power to establish
prices de factogivesthem significant expropriation powers.
One other obvious role for regulation is to facilitate risk sharing in a manner that does not
eliminate incentives for efficient performance. By defining the rate base on which a "fair' return
is allowed, the regulator can penalize the firm for unfavorable outcomes that were due to its own
shortcomings, while at the same time ensuring that consumers share some of the burden of
unfavorable events that could not have been foreseen and avoided. Of course, such discretion in
defining the rate base also renders expropriation a more real possibility.'3- 23-
SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS.
We have outlinedsomeof the important considerations in the choice between public and
private provision of a commodity. We focused on the special concerns introduced by imperfect
information about the productive environment. We identified an ideal setting in which
privatisation is the natural mode of organization. And we outlined a variety of ways in which
real settings differ from the ideal one, noting the implications for the privatization issue.
Important similarities between public and private provision were also identified. Both modes,
for example, are characterized by substantial delegation of authority. The delegation is a natural
response to the problems posed by imperfect information --problemswhich arise under both
forms 0f organization. What distinguishes the modes, in our opinion, are the differences in the
transactions costs of intervention into delegated production relationships. Public enterprise
generally facilitates intervention by the government", while intervention is more difficult under
private enterprise. The difference, however, is only a matter of degree in practice.
In choosing between public and private provision, it is important to consider beth the
expected benefits and the costs of intervention, and the probability that intervention will occur.
Two important elements of this calculation include the complexity of the task under
consideration and the need for rapid adaptation to unforeseen contingencies. When the task is
particularly novel and complex, unforeseen contingencies are likely to arise. And if rapid
adaptation to these events is crucial (as in the case of national defense, for example), ease of
intervention to redirect activities and to limit the duration of renegotiation may be relatively
important; under such circumstances, public provision is more likely to be the preferred mode of
organization.
Of course, when the useofintervention is facilitated, its abuseissimultaneously made more
difficult to control, and inefficiencies will result. To illustrate, managers of public enterprises- 24 -
mayhave insufficientincentivetocontrol costs,knowing that the government is likely to provide
subsidiesto offset any cost overruns.
Inconcluding, we wish toemphasizethat neither publicnorprivate provision canfully resolve
thedifficult incentiveproblems thatarise when considerations of imperfect information result in
delegation of authority. The choice between modes of organization simply defines the
transactionscosts of future intervention into these delegated relationships, andtherebyinfluences
thelikelihoodof such intervention.- 25-
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